By the eighteenth century, Europeans dominated the military technology of gunpowder weapons. Their dominance was surprising, because the technology had originated in China and had been used with expertise in East and South Asia and the Ottoman Empire. Historians have often invoked competition to account for the Europeans' military prowess, but competition cannot explain why they forged ahead in developing this technology. The answer lies in the peculiar form that military competition took in western Europe: it was a tournament that induced European rulers to invest heavily in improving the technology of gunpowder weapons. Political incentives and military conditions kept such a tournament from developing in China, Japan, India, and the Ottoman Empire, and as a result rulers had much less reason to push the gunpowder technology, which had enormous advantages for fighting war at a distance.
the same biological edge. Why was it therefore the Western Europeans who took over the Americas, and not the Chinese or the Japanese?
The history of conquest is not the only evidence for Western Europe's military advantage before 1800. States elsewhere-China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire certainly possessed firearms or ships equipped with artillery, but by the late seventeenth century, ifnot before, nearly all of them had fallen behind in using this technology, which we will label the "gunpowder technology." The case of the Ottoman Empire is illustrative. There the military gap may reach back as far as 1572, when Venetian cannon founders judged that guns captured during the naval battle at Lepanto were simply not worth reusing. The Ottoman cannons had to be melted down-and new metal had to be added to the mixture-because "the material is of such poor quality.t" At a time when the high cost of manufactured goods meant everything was salvaged-even clothing from fallen comrades-that amounts to strong evidence from revealed preference about how .much better Western European weapons had become. The history of trade and the migration of military experts points in the same direction. Although the Ottomans had a "robust ordnance industry" and could threaten Vienna as late as 1683, they did import weapons from western Europe and often relied on the expertise of European military specialists", The Ottoman Empire was hardly exceptional. From the Middle East to East Asia, experts from Western Europe were hired throughout Asia to provide needed help with gun making, tactics, and military organization. They ranged from renegade European gun founders in the sixteenth century to Napoleonic officers the early 1800s. In seventeenth-century China, even Jesuit missionaries were pressed into service to help the Chinese Emperor make better cannons. The evidence for Western Europe's military prowess is so strong that it has even convinced some of the historians who argue against any divergence between Western Europe and advanced areas of China before 1800.
Although they would argue that Western Europe was not wealthier or more developed than rich areas of China, they would acknowledge that its military technology was more advanced.i
The evidence is thus fairly clear, but it is nonetheless surprising that western Europe had come to dominate this technology of gunpowder weapons so early. Firearms and gunpowder, after all, had originated in China and spread throughout Eurasia. States outside Western Europe possessed the revolutionary weapons and did become, at least for a while, proficient at manufacturing or exploiting the new military technology. The Ottomans, for instance, long made high quality artillery-perhaps as late as the 1700s. 8 The Japanese discovered-some twenty years earlier than Western Europeans-the key tactical innovation (volley fire) that allowed infantry soldiers with slow loading muskets to maintain a nearly continuous round of fire," Yet by the late seventeenth century, ifnot before, Chinese, Japanese, and Ottoman military technology and tactics all lagged behind what one found in western Europe."
Why did these other powerful states fall behind? This question has attracted a number of gifted military historians, but most simply describe the Europeans' proficiency, without unearthing its underlying causes. The closest they come to a deeper explanation is the claim that military competition in Europe gave the Europeans an edge.
The argument, which dates back to Gibbon, has been formulated most cogently by Paul Kennedy, who points to Europe's competitive markets and persistent military rivalries.
While military rivalry created an arms race, competitive markets encouraged military innovation and kept one country from establishing an empire. I I That would explain why the military sector in early modern Europe turns out to have experienced rapid and sustained productivity growth-an outcome unknown in other parts of the economy.V Competition, however, is not the final answer. Although it is a first step in the right direction, there is more that needs to be explained. First of all, competitive markets do not always stimulate innovation. The clearest example comes from agriculture in early modern Europe, which had highly competitive markets but witnessed virtually no productivity growth.':' What kept early modern European farmers from reaping the productivity gains of soldiers and sailors?
Nor do ongoing military rivalries always stimulate innovation. They in fact failed to do so in eighteenth-century south and southeast Asia, and in nineteenth-century Latin America too. The case ofIndia, as we shall see, is particularly illuminating, for like Europe it had markets and incessant warfare, and the combatants were quick to adopt the latest weapons and tactics. The innovations, however, by and large originated elsewhere.
The answer to this conundrum lies with the peculiar form of competition that European rulers were engaged in up until 1815. It was not the garden variety economic competition that prevails among small entrepreneurs who maximize profits and at least in theory pay no attention to other firms, Rather, it was political competition in what economists would call a tournament. Competitors in a tournament-in contrast to the idealized small entrepreneurs-must pay attention to one another, because their relative standing determines who wins a single prize. And doing worse does not simply reduce their profits, as with entrepreneurs; rather, it means they win nothing at all. 14 A tournament of this sort had long engaged the monarchs of Europe, and tournaments among rulers existed in other parts of the world as well. Under the right conditions, they spurred rulers to improve military technology in the broadest sense of the word, even at the expense of the rest of the economy. In early modern Europe, the conditions were conducive to advances in military productivity. Elsewhere, however, they were not. Understanding why requires a look at the political, military, and fiscal incentives rulers faced, both in Europe and in other parts of Eurasia. It also requires a glance at the costs and benefits of other military technologies.
The tournament in Europe and its consequences
The states that coalesced in Europe in the waning days of the Middle Ages by and large had a single purpose, at least if we judge by what they levied taxes and borrowed money for. That purpose was clearly warfare. True, funds were spent on justice and palaces, and there was a pittance for transportation and famine relief. But particularly in the major powers, some 40 to 80 percent of the budget went directly to the military, to defray the costs of armies and navies that fought almost without interruption (see Table 1 for the frequency of battles). The fraction of the budget devoted to war climbed even higher-to 95 percent in France during the 30 Years War-ifwe add sums spent subsidizing allies or paying of the debts of past wars."
In early modern Europe, decisions about war typically lay in the hands of a ruler such as a king or a prince. He would of course be advised by councilors and influenced by elites, and an influential minister (a Richelieu or Olivares) might sometimes be dictating most of the decisions. But the assumption that a king or prince made the decisions about war is not far from historical reality. Even in eighteenth-century Britain, where Parliament and the cabinet decided whether to commence hostilities, the choices about the conduct ofthe war once it had begun were up to the king."
What then made European kings take up arms? That question has to be answered if we are to understand what the tournament was. In Europe's major powers, the rulers often won control of warfare in the process of assembling their states in the late Middle Ages or the sixteenth century. They might have constructed their states by defeating domestic and foreign rivals, but typically they offered even conquered provinces protection from foreign enemies, in return for tax revenue. In modern terms, one would say that they provided the public good of defense in return for taxes.
That public good was precious, as anyone who suffered through the horrors of the 100 Years War in France or the 30 Years War in central Europe could testify. But the rulers of early modern Europe likely provided far more defense than their average subject would have wanted. The reasons were not hard to understand. The kings and princes had been raised to fight one another, with toy soldiers, pikes, and firearms as children and actual training in their youth. Advisers like Machiavelli might tell them that princes "ought to have no object, thought, or profession but war." Their own fathers would teach them that war was a path to glory, a means to "distinguish [kings] ... and to fulfill the great expectations ...inspired in the public," in the words of Louis XIV's instructions for his son. They took the lesson to heart and once enthroned often surrounded themselves with images exalting their role as military leaders or glorifying the martial exploits of their reigns, as Louis XIV himself did at Versailles. And they pursued war with gusto, at least if they ruled over a major power. Fighting had gone beyond the needs of defense and become, in the words of Galileo, a "royal sport.,,17
Glory did recede as a motive for war in the eighteenth century, when the major powers might fight simply to preserve their reputation, to gain commercial advantage, or to snatch territory from weaker neighbors. But war was still "what rulers did," the normal target for their ambitions. It continued to appeal to them, just as it long had attracted much of the European aristocracy. 1 8 For the major monarchs of early modern Europe, victory was thus a source of glory or a way to enhance their reputation. They could gain smaller amounts of prestige by fighting, or even by raising a large army. Grabbing territory from small neighbors would add to their standing and augment their resources. And although they might lose small amounts territory themselves, they faced no major downside risk to their thrones, at least in the larger states. Smaller principalities might be swallowed up if defeated, but for western Europe's bigger powers, loss in battle in anything but a civil war never toppled a monarch from his throne, at least in the years 1500-1799 (Table 2) .19 Nor did warfare threaten Europe's kings and princes with personal financial ruin, for the funds to pay for war by and large came from tax revenues, not from the rulers' own possessions.
Although they might worry about tax revolts, the negotiations that went into to the construction of the larger European states insulated powerful elites from many of the tax increases. Without backing from the elites, the revolts were less of a threat."
Europe's major monarchs thus had every reason to fight and even stronger reasons to outdo their neighbors and win victories. They would have an incentive to vie with one another for a prize that would go to the winner and they would really exert themselves, because victory would depend on beating or outlasting their enemies. Of course not all rulers would participate. Some countries would be too small, and others (the Netherlands in the eighteenth century, for example), though big enough to fight, would bow out, or at least not enter a particular war.
Such a contest is an example of the economists' tournament. Potential contestants can choose whether or not to join in, and the reward that motivates them depends on their relative performance. To win the prize, they exert effort, which may be harder or more costly for some potential entrants than others. If the reward is large, the effort elicited can be huge, particularly if the number of contestants who enter is not too large.
This sort of tournament is what drives top notch athletes, such as a talented baseball player, to extreme measures in the quest for success. The prize the baseball player seeks is a professional career, and victory depends on whether he is better---even by only a slight amount-than other players. He is therefore likely to go to extremes such as taking drugs that may harm him later in life-just to get that slight margin of victory. A tournament, it has been argued, is also what justifies the pay of corporate CEOs. Their huge compensation packages are the prize that motivates executives below them to push themselves in the hope of someday becoming CEO's themselves.
Tournaments are also used to promote research and improve technology. The defense department has in fact run tournaments to choose whether Lockheed or Northrop would develop an improved jet fighter, and it has sponsored a recent one to support research on robotic vehicles?'
Here skeptics may complain that the notion of a tournament really adds little and that it seems little more than a complex label stuck on the older and altogether adequate idea of competition. Yet a closer look at the features of tournaments should help put that objection to rest, particularly if we look more closely at the tournament in early modem Europe and compare it with military rivalries elsewhere in the world.
To begin with, there is one feature of tournaments that clearly distinguishes them from garden variety economic competition, as we can see by varying the number of entrants who compete. In a tournament, if only one competitor enters-one prince, for instance, in early modern Europe-he will exert no effort. He does not have to, because his prize is guaranteed. In a market, by contrast, a single entrant, such as the lone firm making a product, may well exert itself, because it can sell goods at a monopoly price.
The monopoly rights may in fact give the firm a powerful incentive to do research that will make its monopoly even more valuable. A single competitor in a tournament would never behave that way.
Other differences emerge as the number of competitors grows. In a market, competition increases with the number of entrants, but that need not be so in a tournament. Indeed, under certain conditions, the total effort expended may even fall as the number of entrants rises above two, for the odds of winning fall, which reduces the expected value of any prize. Someone who designs a tournament can in fact usually achieve any desired level of effort at lowest cost in term of the prize that has to be offered simply by limiting entry to two competitors."
That is how many competitors the tournament in early modern Europe often had, particularly if we take into account the alliances between countries. The Hapsburgs battled the kings of France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the English fought French in the eighteenth. Other sizeable powers-the Swedes and the Dutch dropped out, while smaller countries simply did not participate, except perhaps as allies.
The number of rivals who actually entered the tournament was thus small enough to keep them from getting discouraged, and the prize was apparently valuable enough to get them to expend effort. The value here has to be measured relative to the costs ofjoining the tournament, which would include the expenses involved in setting up armies, navies, and fiscal systems, and the political costs of raising taxes to fund the military. Those political costs could not have been too high.
What did all this effort go for? It went to pay for larger armies and navies and to improve tactics, logistics, and military technology. Gunpowder weapons required centralized revenue and expenditure, particularly when armies and navies swelled and the technology improved. In an era before nationalism motivated troops, armies had to be centralized, for if soldiers (many of whom were mercenaries) were scattered across a country, desertions would soar. The cost of shipping supplies to the infantry also encouraged the centralization of armies, and it had a similar effect on navies. Countries that could organize more effective provisioning could prevent mutinies and desertions and retain the loyalty of veteran troops, who often provided the margin of victory." As for navies, they needed suitable ports, meaning ones which could easily be defended and which, at least by the eighteenth century, would be deep enough for ships of the line. The scarcity of such harbors also favored centralization?4 Fortifications had the same effect.
It was extraordinarily expensive to build them large enough to house a defensive battery of cannons and strong enough to stand up under an siege, and their design required the expertise of skilled military architects. The cost put them out of reach for small principalities and limited the number that could be constructed. Even in large kingdoms the money devoted to fortifications had to be allocated carefu lly, so as to protect frontiers, key passes, and vulnerable cities or harbors.i"
The clearest mark of all this effort was huge great increase in the tax revenues that central governments collected, at least among the major powers. For France and England, where fiscal records begin early, the per capita tax burden (measured in grams of silver) rose over 6-fold between the 1540s and the 1780s (Table 3 ). Picking other decades or measuring per-capita taxes in grain or days ofa workman's labor would not change the results appreciably. By the eighteenth century, France may have been spending 5 to 10 percent of its GDP on military, and Great Britain even more-perhaps as much as 28 percent." For countries that were still poor by modem standards, these figures are quite high. For comparison, at the end ofthe Cold War, the United States was spending 5 percent of its GDP on the military, and the USSR perhaps 10 percent."
Here one might object that raising taxes would take no effort at all, at least in absolute monarchies like France and Spain. But even under absolutism taxes were limited by the concessions made to elites when kingdoms were assembled. The kings of France and Spain could not simply raise taxes at will without provoking elite resistance, particularly in provinces that had joined the kingdom late. The monarchs had to negotiate, offer additional privileges and liberties, or simply go without added revenue.
Outside of Britain, which was far ahead of the rest of western Europe, it would take the even greater efforts of centralization during the Napoleonic Wars (and the creation of Better technology did not spread overnight-otherwise no ruler would have had an incentive to innovate-but it did eventually diffuse among the military powers and keep anyone of them from gaining a monopoly on military strength. The effect was to make the European tournament work almost like an idealized prize system that put winning ideas into the public domain. The rulers of major powers had every reason to improve their militaries, because they wanted the glory, renown, or added territory that came with victory, but they would be less likely to pile triumph upon triumph and come to dominate the entire continent or even put an end to the tournament itself. Competitors would thus begin each new tournament with roughly the same improved technology and the same impetus to push it even further. 33 We can actually measure the rate at which military technology was improving, in the same way that we can gauge the productivity of modern workers and industries. The yardsticks used are perhaps crude and fail to capture advances in tactics or provisioning that were an integral part of the gunpowder technology. They also have trouble with naval warfare, where western Europe's lead was perhaps greatest. The reason, beyond the scarcity of quantitative data for early navies, is simply that warships had variety of different goals, which varied over time. Firepower dominated the eighteenth century, but speed, range, and an ability to fight in inclement weather were also important, particularly in wars of economic attrition that were focus of earlier warfare at sea."
Yet despite all these difficulties, the evidence that military productivity was advancing in early modern Europe is clear. Captains in the British navy, for example, learned how to became much more effective fighters, which drastically cut their fatality rate. If one holds constant the intensity and amount of fighting the captains were exposed to, their odds of dying in typical five year period fell from 16 percent in 1670-90 to one in a thousand in 1790-1810. 35 On land, the effective firing rate per French infantryman jumped by a factor of 6 or more between 1600 and 1750, as bayonets made it possible to replace pike men and matchlocks were supplanted by flintlocks with ramrods and paper cartridges ( Yet another sign of rapid productivity growth was the falling price of weapons, which dropped faster than the cost of other manufactured goods (Figure 1 ). The price of weapons also tumbled relative to the cost of the relevant factors of production." Like modem computer manufacturers, the gunsmiths of late medieval and early modem
Europe were growing more effective at making weapons, and as in modern industries the productivity growth was particularly rapid when new weapons were first introduced.
When the first handguns appeared on the scene circa 1400 (they were little more than tiny, hand held cannons that could be fired from atop a city's walls), the metal founders who cast them reduced the price drastically." They did so by cutting the amount of copper they used, so that the weight of the cannons plummetted ( Figure 2 ). That may seem obvious to us, but in an era when cannons regularly exploded (Figure 3 ), it marked real progress.
Rising productivity is what would be expected from a tournament, if the prize was large, if the costs of exerting effort (particularly the political costs of raising taxes to fund the military) were not too high, if the number of contestants was small-but greater than There is one final condition that may have kept the Chinese from pushing the gunpowder technology. When this technology finally became appealing in the seventeenth century, it may simply have been more advantageous to acquire it from the Europeans, by asking the Portuguese (or the Jesuits) to provide designs and expertise."
The European rulers, after all, had already been through a tournament, They had already invested heavily in improving the gunpowder technology and learned a great deal by working with it. They had become specialists in the technology, and rather than duplicating their efforts, a Chinese Emperor might find it much cheaper to buy the European innovations by hiring European experts. The relative prices of weapons in
China and the direction of trade in military expertise certainly point in that direction."
Quantitative evidence bears out these claims about China. The Chinese did invent a large number of weapons-more thanjust gunpowder and firearms-and not surprisingly the discoveries tended to be made when emperors were at war. 46 But over the years 1500-1799, China was less likely than major European powers to be fighting foreign enemies against whom gunpowder weapons might prove useful. It was less likely to be battling foreign enemies overall, and most of the hostilities involved civil wars or nomads, which left little room for innovation. If these two sorts of strife are set aside, the contrast with major European powers is striking ( Ages, reduced the value of the prize in the Indian tournament, by raising the odds that a prince or other ruler would be unable to enjoy fruits of victory. As a result, Indian rulers would exert less effort to upgrade weapons and tactics or centralize provisioning.
The political and economic costs of centralizing taxation and army funding were also major obstacles in India. It seems to have been easier for Indian military leaders and other members of the elite to defect and join the enemy. Behavior of this sort was less common in Europe, particularly after the early seventeenth century. Indian rulers might therefore have hesitated before raising or centralizing taxes out of fear that elites would jump ship." In addition, grain markets in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century India were more fragmented than in Europe, which would make centralized provisioning and tax collection all the more difficult. 55 In a tournament, the higher political and economic costs would in tum mean less effort overall and less innovation"
If we consider the most powerful successor states to the Mughal Empire, most of them did fail to develop to develop centralized tax and supply systems. That is a telltale sign that the conditions in the Indian tournament were different, because advancing the gunpowder technology depended on centralizing the fisc and provisioning. In this situation, the British East India Company thus had an enormous advantage in India, even though it was only a private enterprise, because it could easily use its own financial system, which was already in place, to centralize the funding of war. That advantage allowed it to conquer much ofIndia, simply by hiring away the best officers and their troops."
Conclusion
The idea of the tournament yields a deeper understanding of why Europeans pushed the gunpowder technology so far and why therefore they were the ones to conquer the world. The rulers of western Europe's major powers were competing in a tournament, under conditions that drove them to improve the artillery, firearms, fortifications, and armed ships that they deployed in their wars. Since the gunpowder technology required it, they raised taxes and strove to centralize provisioning and the fiscal system. They overspent on the military and provided more defense than their subjects likely desired. But they had little reason not to. Victory in the tournament won them glory, enhanced reputations, and resources from territory snatched away from smaller neighbors. Losses never cost them their throne, at least for the major powers and as long as they faced no civil war. Finally, the rulers did not bear the full costs of warfare, and neither did elites with political voice, who in any case often aspired to military careers.i"
The small number of contestants in Europe kept the level of effort high, in contrast to India, at least before the eighteenth century. The economic and political costs of centralization were more favorable in Europe, while the value of the tournament prize was not diminished by frequent strife over succession. And in Europe, the market for weapons and military skills helped prevent one country from getting too far ahead, although there was an important element of historical contingency involved. Had one power crushed the others-the Habsburgs in the sixteenth century, or Napoleon at the height of his power-the tournament in Europe would have halted, as it did in early modem Japan. But that never happened in Europe. It never enjoyed the political unity that would have cut the incentives for military innovation, as in China or in Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate.
Other factors were of course involved. Against nomads, the gunpowder technology-and the centralized provisioning and tax collection that went with it-were of little use. It therefore had limited appeal to Ottomans, and even less to the Chinese.
But even here the tournament gives us insight. When the technology finally did become attractive, as in eighteenth-century India and perhaps in seventeenth-century China too, it was cheaper to buy it from the Europeans. The experience the Europeans had gained in their tournament had given them a comparative advantage and they were perfect willing to export their expertise.
This expertise in turn allowed the Europeans to wage war at a distance. Not that they were posting huge infantry armies abroad. But they could dispatch ships armed with cannons to prey upon trade in places as far away as Southeast Asia, and for protection and essential supplies of water and fresh food, the ships could rely upon European style fortresses, which, when built in Asia or the Americas, could be defended with a relatively small force. The fortresses thus complemented the naval forces and allowed the Europeans to hold critical trading points and to protect what land they conquered without sending large numbers of officers and men abroad-an expensive undertaking given the high mortality rates during long voyages. And the defense worked both against attacks by native powers and by other Europeans, who were always a threat.
To make this whole argument persuasive, there are still a number of questions that need to be answered. How do we explain the historical contingencies that brought a tournament to an end in Japan and kept one power from conquering the others in Europe?
What role did relative prices of land and labor play, and how did they and the history of In Fullerton and McAfee's model ofa tournament, n potential contestants (each with a different cost c, of exterting effort) each simultaneously decide whether to enter the tournament and compete for a prize P that will be awarded to the one with the best innovation. A potential contestant who enters exerts effort z > 0 and pays a fixed cost b to improve their innovation; the effort z gives the contestant a random innovation x, where x has cumulative distribution function F'(x) and the function F has support [0, a] . The highest realized value ofx wins the prize, and a potential contestant who does not enter the tournament avoids the fixed cost but has no chance for winning the prize. The innovations are independently distributed across contestants with the same function F for all of them. Ifwe ignore the fact that the effort z need not be an integer, then it would be as if each entrant were taking z independent draws from the underlying distribution F.
There is a unique equilibrium in the resulting game in which the potential contestants with the lowest costs c, enter the tournament. If the potential contestants are arranged according to their costs c, from lowest (when i = 1) to highest (when i = n), then in this equilibrium m contestants will enter, where m satisfies
(1) Ifwe let (CI + C2 + ... + cm) = C and let Z denote the sum of the effort levels Zi exerted by each of the m entrants, then in this equilibrium,
The resulting distribution of winning innovations is Pz (x) . Greater effort therefore raises the expected value of the winning innovation x and the likelihood that it has a higher value. Three things are worth noting here. First, if only one contestant enters the tournament, he exerts no effort and there is no innovation. Second, if the potential entrants' costs c, are all multiplied by a > 1, then (1) and (2) imply that the number of entrants remains the same but they exert less effort. As a result, there is less innovation.
Similarly, a bigger prize bigger prize P increases effort by each entrant without changing the total number of entrants. The bigger prize therefore leads to more innovation provided that there are at least 2 entrants. Source: (Wright 1942, 1: Tables 29, 45, 46) ; (Levy 1983) leads to similar results.
Note: The principal European powers are defined as France, Austria, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Turkey, and Poland. Source: (Langer 1968) .
Note: The calculation of the conditional probabilities begins with a count of sovereigns who were deposed after losing a foreign war for the Austrian Dominions, France, Great Britain, the Hohenzollern lands, and Spain. The count includes any assassinations provoked by loss in a foreign war, but it excludes assassination or removal from office during civil wars and internal revolutions, unless the cause was the loss of a foreign war. In particular, the executions of king Charles I of England and Louis XVI of France are not counted, and the same holds for the removal of James II of England and the deposition of Ferdinand II in Bohemia in 1618. The calculations also exclude the simple downfall of ministries. The number of deposed monarchs is then divided by the number of years the country was at war; that yields the probability of deposition after losing a foreign war conditional on being at war. War here is defined as any class of armed conflict significant enough to be included in Langer; no formal declaration of war is necessary. It includes colonial fighting, but it excludes civil wars unless foreign powers are involved. The calculation of the probability of deposition conditional on losing a war is similar; the only difference is the number of deposed monarchs is divided by the number of years in which a war ended with a loss for the country concerned. Sovereigns included all monarchs, whether absolute or constitutional. For republics, the sovereign was the parliament or legislative assemblies; if the legislative assemblies shared sovereignty with a president or other executive, then the sovereign was the executive and the legislative assemblies together. The Austrian dominions exclude Habsburgterritory in Iberian Peninsula, Italy, Low Countries, and Latin America. Bohemia is excluded before Habsburgs assume the crown in 1526, and Hungary is not counted until it was fully integrated into the Habsburg holdings in 1699. For France, the Convention is counted as a sovereign; Napoleon's abdication in 1814 is counted as a removal after a loss, but not his second abdication after Waterloo. For Great Britain, the calculation concerns England and Ireland alone up until 1603; during the Protectorate, the Lord Protector is counted as sovereign. For Spain, depositions do not include loss of Portugal or of non-Iberian possessions. All the probabilities are ex-post, and they clearly make more sense for monarchies than for republics. The table leaves out countries that were major powers at some point between 1500 and 1800-Sweden and the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, and Russia in the eighteenth. Source: (Lynn 1997,457-460,464-465,469-472) Notes: The calculation considers only pike men and infantrymen with firearms; it ignores unarmed solders, such as drummers. The implied rate of labor productivity growth over the 150 year period from 1600 to 1750 is between 1.3 and 1.7 percent per year. Ln(Price Pistols/Price Spades) See Parry 1970; Inalcik 1975; Parker 1996,87-89,126-129,173-175; Heywood 2002a; Heywood 2002b; Chase 2003, 2, 97-98; and Agoston 2005, especially pp. 10-12 Wong 1997, 89-90; Pomeranz 2000, 199-200. 8 Guilmartin 1974,255-263; Agoston 2005 9 With volley fire, infantrymen were trained to line up in long rows. The first row would fire their muskets, and while they were reloading, the rows behind them would advance to the front and take their place on the firing line. For volley fire in Europe and Japan, see Parker 1996, 18-19, 140-141 . 10 Agoston, [10] [11] [12] 17 Louis-XIV and Sonnino 1970, 124; Machiavelli 1977,247; Hale 1985,29-32; Cornette 1993,16-19,23-64,151-176. 18 Lynn 2000; Bell 2007, 29-35. 19 Civil wars are of course another matter; in Table 2 they include all hostilities that involve domestic enemies, even if foreign powers were also engaged. Mallett 1974; Hale 1985,69,141-146; Parker 1996, 50-52; Hanlon 1998; Bell 2007, 28 . For an earlier example of how the technology of making weapons spread, see Cipolla 1965 for the role that the Dutch played in establishing the armaments industry in Sweden.
32 Willers 1973, 220-308; Cornette 1993,47-48; Parker 1996, 19-24 33 The argument here depends on the assumption that the European tournament was not a repeated game and that efforts to improve technology behave like independent draws from a common distribution. Technically, the second assumption amounts to saying that distribution of each competitor's innovations x is F Z (x) where z is the competitor's effort and F is a distribution common to all competitors. See the appendix and Fullerton and
McAfee 1999 for details.
34 Guilmartin 1974,253-254; Guilmartin 1983; Glete 1993, 58-61 35 Benjamin and Tifrea 2007, 981-984 . As the authors argue, the lower death rates were not simply the result of Britain's naval dominance in the late eighteenth century, for they were already lower by 1710, before Britain's lead was overwhelming. The calculations are based on a hazard rate fractional logit regression and assume that the intensity and frequency of battle are held constant. Spence 1969, 15,29; Chase 2003,167-171 , and Li Bozhong, personal communication.
The issue was not the ability to cast metal, for Chinese craftsmen were likely as good or better than Europeans at doing that. Rather, it was the design and testing of the cannons. 45 If the fragmentary data from the early seventeenth century are believable, the price of muskets in China (measured relative to food) was was 3 to 9 times higher in China than it was in England or France. 46 Margaret Chen, a graduate student in economics at UC Davis, has gathered data on Chinese military inventions over the past three millennia for a comparative paper on Europe and China that she and I are doing. Other things being equal, the military inventions were more common under dynasties that spent more than half their time at war. 47 The argument about the Ottomans and nomads is taken from Chase, and the evidence about Ottoman tax receipts comes from ongoing research by Sevket Pamuk. The differences in warfare also mattered at sea. In a forthcoming book, Daniel Headrick notes that the speed and maneuverability of Ottoman galleys kept the Portuguese from dominating the Red Sea. Out on the ocean the story was different. 48 Parry 1970; Agoston 2005, 10-12, 193-194 49 Kolff 1990; Gommans and Kolff2001; Gommans 2003. 50 Even defenders of Indian military prowess admit that the advances with the gun powder technology by and large came from the West. See Subrahmanyam 1987; Barua 1994; Alavi 1995,24-25; Cooper 2003 ,31-32,42-44,289-294. 51 Kolff 1990 Gommans and Kolff2001; Gommans 2003. 52Gommans 2003. The reasons why alliances were weak are complex. As Gommans points out, it was difficult for Indian warriors to cement alliances via marriage, something that was quite common in Europe. It may also have been easier to defect from an alliance and hire soldiers, because wars were fought during the agricultural slack season when wages were low. In Europe, by contrast, the off season-winter-was a time for armies to rest. 58 Hale 1985, 91-140; Cornette 1993,294; Hanlon 1998,241- 
